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VIOLENCE AND INJURY IN ILLINOIS
SCHOOLS: STUDENTS DESERVE A
REMEDY
SARAH LINDLEY*

INTRODUCTION

A developmentally disabled female student was sodomized by
a male student on the bus while being transported home from
school.1 Homer Williams, the bus driver, failed to prevent or
intervene in the sexual assault of the female student. In her
complaint against the school district, the victim alleged that the
school board committed willful and wanton 3 misconduct by failing
to prevent or intervene in her sexual assault.4 The Appellate
Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint, reasoning that the school board had
immunity pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act. ' Further, in
addressing section 34-84(a) of the Illinois School Code,6 which
places an affirmative duty on school boards, through their agents,
to maintain discipline among students, the court held that the
School Code does not defeat immunity conferred upon public
* J.D. Candidate, June 2002
1. A.R. v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 724 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
2. Id.
3.

Holsapple v. Casey Community Unit Sch. Dist. C-i, 510 N.E.2d 499,

500 (Ill. 1987) (quoting Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 69
N.E.2d 293, 300 (Ill. 1946)). The Supreme Court of Illinois has defined willful
and wanton conduct as an intentional injury or act "committed under
circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as
failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to
prevent it ... " Id.

4. A.R., 724 N.E.2d at 10.
5. Pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act, the school board was immune from liability for its
negligent conduct. Id. at 11. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-102 (West 2000)
provides in part that:
[n]either a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure
to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection
service or, if police protection is provided, for failure to provide adequate
police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes,
failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify or apprehend
criminals.
6. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a (West 2000).
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entities pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act.7
Compare the previous Illinois case to a similar matter in New

Jersey, where a student riding on a school bus was blinded in one
eye by a pellet shot by a fellow student.8 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey asserted that the school board had failed to exercise
"reasonable supervisory care" for the safety of its students.9 In
affirming the trial court's finding for the plaintiff, the court
reasoned that in an action against a board of education for
personal injury damages, "ordinary principles of negligence"
should apply. 10
Clearly, the legal analysis and reasoning in the Illinois and
New Jersey cases illustrates that both jurisdictions maintain
opposing views of municipal liability. This Comment explores
Illinois municipal liability with respect to education and the duty
to supervise students, ultimately proposing a change in the
current standard. Part I begins with an analysis of immunity in
Illinois, both past and present. It also examines the current
willful and wanton exception to immunity. Part II explores
educational liability in South Carolina, New Jersey, New York,
and California, and compares their respective standards to the
current Illinois law. Part III proposes that Illinois adopt a
combination of South Carolina and New York law, namely a gross
negligence standard with an emphasis on foreseeability.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

The Illinois courts extended the concept of sovereign
immunity to schools in 1898." However, the Illinois Supreme

7. Section 5/34-84(a) states that "[teachers] stand in the relation of
parents and guardians to the pupils." Thus, teachers are immune from
liability resulting from negligent supervision, unless willful and wanton
conduct is plead and proven. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.
8. Jackson v. Hankinson, 238 A.2d 685, 685 (N.J. 1968).
9. Id. at 687.

10. Id. The court refused to apply the concept of "active wrongdoing,"
which emphasized the notion that municipalities should be immune from tort
responsibility. Id. The court noted that "there has been a shift towards frank
recognition that municipal entities, along with all or others, should justly be

held accountable for injuries resulting from their tortious acts and omissions
under ordinary principles of negligence .... " Id. at 688. The court also
emphasized that the relationship between students and school authorities is
not voluntary; rather, students are required by law to attend school. Id.
Thus, school boards are obligated to take the reasonable precautions necessary
to ensure the safety and well-being of their students, and if a school board's
negligence causes a child to be injured, it should be held accountable in the
same manner as other tortfeasors. Id.
11. Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 49 N.E. 536, 537 (Ill. 1898). In Kinnare, the

Illinois Supreme Court held that the Chicago Board of Education was immune
from liability for the death of an employee who had fallen from the roof of a
school building because the Board failed to provide scaffolding and other
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Court abolished that same immunity in 1959.12 The Illinois
Constitution formally adopted this abolition of sovereign immunity
in 1970.'3 Specifically, article 13, section 4 provides that "[e]xcept
as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity
in this state is abolished." 4 However, in 1965 the legislature
passed the Local Government and Governmental Employers Tort
Immunity Act."8 As a result, legislation enacted to "protect local
public entities and public employees from liability arising from the
operation of government"
superseded the court's abolishment of
6
sovereign immunity.1
In 1998, the legislature amended section 3-10817 of the Tort
Immunity Act to exclude willful and wanton misconduct.'8
safeguards. Id. The court reasoned that school boards, like other state
agencies, should not be liable for the torts or negligence of its agents. Id.
12. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96
(Ill. 1959). In Molitor, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the notion of
sovereign immunity with respect to school boards and school districts. Id.
The plaintiff brought an action against the school district for personal injuries
sustained by his son when the school bus he was riding in exploded and
burned, as a result of the bus driver's negligence. Id. at 89. The court
reasoned that in contemporary times, the legal system should not regress to
medieval premises of liability. Id. at 96. In response to the defendants' notion
that immunity preserves and protects public funds and property, the court
stated "[wie do not believe that in this present day and age, when public
education constitutes one of the biggest businesses in the country, that school
immunity can be justified on the protection-of-public-funds theory." Id. at 94.
The court also asserted that abolishing immunity might decrease the
frequency of school bus accidents, because school districts will be encouraged
to exercise greater care in the selection and supervision of bus drivers. Id. at
95.
13. David A. Decker, When the King Does Wrong: What Immunity Does
Local Government Deserve?, 86 ILL. B.J. 138, 140 (1998).
14. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 4.)
15. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2000).
16. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101.1 (West 2000).

17. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108 (West 2000). The statute reads as
follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity
nor a public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the
use of any public property is liable for an injury unless the local public
entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its
supervision proximately causing such injury.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity
nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to
supervise an activity on or the use of any public property unless the
employee or the local public entity has a duty to provide supervision
imposed by common law, statute, ordinance, code or regulation and the
local public entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton
conduct in its failure to provide supervision proximately causing such
injury.
18. In 1997, the governor vetoed this amendment for fear that an increase
in accountability for willful and wanton supervision would "open the
floodgates" for lawsuits and "risk eroding the tort immunity that has
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However, the legislature also amended section 1-210,19 which
defines "willful and wanton conduct." Particularly, section 1-210
of the Illinois Statute reads as follows:
"[wiillful and wanton conduct" as used in this Act means a course of
action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm
or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or
conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This
definition shall apply in any case where a "willful and wanton"
exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.2 °
The legislature has not extended this amendment to all
sections of the Tort Immunity Act, and the Illinois Supreme Court
cautioned courts "not to depart from the plain language of the Tort
Immunity Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations,
or
21
conditions that conflict with express legislative intent."
Prior to the 1998 amendment of section 3-108 of the Tort
Immunity Act, educators were virtually immune from liability if
the cause of action was predicated on the duty to supervise.
However, not all school district defendants sought immunity under
the Act.22 Rather, much of the case law in Illinois centers on the
court's interpretation of applicable provisions of the Illinois School
Code,2" which the legislature enacted in 1961.
Particularly,
sections 5/24-2424 and 5/34-84a 25 pertain to liability that stems
from the duty to supervise. Both sections state in part that "[iun
all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools
and the school children, [the teachers] stand in the relation of

traditionally been afforded municipalities and that is essential to the effective
delivery of government services." Decker, supra note 13, at 143-44. This
premise seemingly draws from Russell v. Men of Devon, a 1788 English case in

which government tort immunity was established. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
In Russell, the court reasoned that "it is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Id. at
362.
19. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-210 (West 2000).

20. Id.
21. A.R. v. Chicago Bd. Of Educ., 724 N.E.2d 6, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
22. Henrich v. Libertyville High Sch., 683 N.E.2d 135, 138-39 (1997). For
example, in Henrich, the plaintiff cited to several Illinois Supreme Court cases

that addressed the willful and wanton exemption of sections 24-24 and 34-84a
of the School Code, alleging that in those matters the defendants were only
entitled to immunity as to negligent supervision, but not as to willful and
wanton misconduct. Id. The court rejected plaintiffs argument. Id. at 139. It

reasoned that the cited cases did not address the applicability of the Tort
Immunity Act, because the defendants in the cited cases did not avail

themselves of immunity under the Act. Id.
23. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2000).
24. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (West 2000) (applying to cities of
500,000 or less).
25. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a (West 2000). (applying to cities of
500,000 or more).
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parents and guardians to the pupils." 2 Thus, to impose liability on
educators pursuant to the aforementioned statutes, a plaintiff
must prove willful and wanton misconduct. 7 The Supreme Court
of Illinois has held that the in loco parentis relationship extends to
all activities associated with the school, and applies in
nondisciplinary as well as disciplinary matters.
The Illinois courts offered several policy reasons in support of
the current standard. For example, it has been asserted that the
School Code reflects a legislative intent that emphasizes the in
loco parentis relationship as necessary for a successful learning
environment. Thus, to hold teacher and school districts liable for
ordinary acts of negligence would seriously jeopardize this
relationship. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has somewhat
limited this argument through its 1993 narrowing of parental
immunity. ° The supreme court also indicated that a higher
standard of liability would constrain educators, because they
would be in constant fear of impending lawsuits.2 ' The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that consequently, the impending nature of
such actions would drain teacher time and possibly discourage
persons from pursuing education as a career. 2 Still, the majority
view has not gone uncriticized. Judges have written strong
dissenting opinions condemning school boards for their
unwillingness to assume responsibility, along with criticism of the
court's strict interpretation of willful and wanton misconduct. 2

26. Id. See also 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (2000).

27. See Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ill.
1976)
(holding that both statutes were intended to confer the status of in loco
parentis upon educators). Thus, since parents are only liable to children for

willful and wanton misconduct, teachers should not be subjected to liability
stemming from mere negligence. Id.
28. Hopwood v. Elmwood Community High Sch. Dist. 322, 525 N.E.2d 247,
248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). See also Montague v. Sch. Bd. of Thornton Fractional

Township North High Sch. Dist. 215, 373 N.E.2d 719, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
(holding that a teacher had not acted willfully and wantonly by positioning a
vaulting horse too high thereby causing a student injury).
29. Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323, 1325 (Ill. 1978).
30. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (Ill. 1993). In Cates, the supreme
court held that a child may recover against a parent for negligence except
when the conduct is inherent to the parent-child relationship.
Id.
Accordingly, the court fashioned a new test for immunity, which centered on
whether the alleged conduct involved parental discretion, discipline, and

supervision or care of the child. Id.
31. Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 395 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ill. 1979).

32. Id.
33. See Booker v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 394 N.E.2d 452, 455-56 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (Simon, J., dissenting). The appellate court conceded that a teacher may
never maintain total control over a classroom; however,
[aln acceptable school system requires that a board of education assume

responsibility for protecting students who receive such threats and
report them to the school authorities ...[and a] jury could reasonably
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Subsequent to the enactment of the School Code, courts were
forced to differentiate between it and the Tort Immunity Act.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the Tort Immunity Act took
precedence.8 ' Thus, when the Tort Immunity Act applied, the
minimal relief granted to plaintiffs through the School Code was
destroyed. Upon reaching that conclusion the Illinois Supreme
Court conceded that:
[wie realize that our decision may be perceived as potentially
leading to harsh results in that students injured during supervised
activities in public schools will no longer be able to recover from a
school district even if the school district engaged in willful
35 and
wanton misconduct related to the supervision of the activity.
Although the legislature has limited specific sections of the
Tort Immunity Act to willful and wanton misconduct, the premise
that the Tort Immunity Act takes precedence over the School Code
continues to dominate, and has been extended to additional
sections of the Act."6 Apparently, if school board defendants
present a theory of immunity pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act,

find that the teacher's conduct was wanton, that she recklessly
abandoned her duty to safeguard the plaintiff and exhibited a wilful
disregard for the plaintiffs safety by failing to recognize and prevent the
foreseeable and imminent danger that the extortionist would carry out
her threats if presented with an opportunity to do so.
Id. See also Grant v. Bd. of Trustees of Valley View Sch. Dist., 676 N.E.2d
705, 709 (1997) (Breslin, J., dissenting) (asserting that defendant school
board's failure to alert mother of suicide victim of the serious risk that victim
posed to himself amounted to willful and wanton conduct, and should have
been question for jury).
34. Henrich v. Libertyville High Sch., 683 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997). In Henrich, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiffs claim for failure to state a cause of action, because the school board
defendant was immune from liability pursuant to section 3-108(a) of the Tort
Immunity Act. Id. The court maintained that one of the purposes of the Tort
Immunity Act was to provide immunity to "local public entit[ies]" such as
school districts. Id. at 139. Moreover, the court concluded that the statutes
were to be interpreted independently of each other. Id. at 140. Thus, even
though the School Code did provide immunity for willful and wanton conduct,
section 10/3-108(a) of the Tort Immunity Act did not. Id. Because the statutes
were to be interpreted independently, the defendant could avail itself of the
immunity afforded by the Tort Immunity Act. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., D.M. v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 713 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999). The plaintiff was assaulted while riding home from school. Id.
His complaint alleged that the school district had knowledge of the assailant's
previous attack on the victim; thus, the district willfully and wantonly failed
to protect plaintiff from danger. Id. The court noted that even though section
3-108(a) of the Tort Immunity Act had expressly narrowed the scope of
immunity to willful and wanton misconduct, section 2-201 of the School Code
had not, and the "amendment did not affect the supreme court's conclusion
that the Tort Immunity Act preempts the School Code.. . ." Id. at 202.
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plaintiffs will not recover.37 This notion is especially ironic
considering that in 1959 the supreme court, in eradicating
sovereign immunity in Illinois, concluded that "the rule of school
district tort immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason,
and has no rightful place in modern day society."38
The courts have created a foundation of analysis with respect
to willful and wanton misconduct in the context of the Illinois
School Code. Acknowledging that willful and wanton misconduct
is difficult to prove, courts have been consistently stringent in
interpreting behavior that is alleged to fall within the parameters
of the School Code's only immunity exception.39 Rather, only in a
limited number of instances have the courts been willing to apply
the willful and wanton exception. °
37. See A.R. v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 724 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(holding that the plaintiff, who had been sodomized by a male student on the
bus ride home, had failed to state a cause of action, because the plaintiffs
claim was predicated on the failure of the defendant to prevent one student
from committing a crime against another, which fell under section 4-102 of the
Tort Immunity Act).
38. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96
(Ill. 1959).
39. See, e.g., Templar v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Dist., 538 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989). In Templar, the plaintiff experienced permanent, partial loss
of vision in one eye as a result of being hit in the eye by a male student while
waiting for the school doors to open. Id. The plaintiffs father had telephoned
the administration four times regarding the behavior of the male student who
eventually assaulted his daughter. Id. The court held that no evidence of
willful and wanton misconduct existed and affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict for the school board defendant. Id.
In Poynter v. Kankakee Sch. Dist. No. 111, the plaintiff brought an
action to recover for injuries received as a result of a riot that erupted at
school. 370 N.E.2d 667, 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant school board had knowledge of an impending disturbance and failed
to take steps to avoid the riot and protect its students from the consequences
of a potential riot. Id. The principal of the school had received information
that on a particular day there would be a racial altercation between black and
white students. Id. at 669. To prevent the impending riot, the principal
stationed himself in the parking lot to prohibit an assembly of students in that
area. Id. However, he did not ask or call for the assistance of other faculty
members or the police. Id. The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege
any willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendants. Id. at 670.
In Booker v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., the plaintiff was physically assaulted
by her school classmates in the bathroom. 394 N.E.2d 452, 453 (11. App. Ct.
1979). Her teacher had been told that these particular classmates had
threatened the victim with physical harm unless she made payments of money
to them. Id. With this knowledge, the teacher appointed as monitor the
student that the victim had named as the leader of the classmates who had
threatened her. Id. When the victim was inside the bathroom, she was
physically assaulted by a group of classmates. Id. The victim's complaint
against the school board was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Id. at 455.
40. See Gammon v. Edwardsville Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7, 403
N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the school district had
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Both the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Court
have offered several definitions, 41 as well as requirements, of
willful and wanton misconduct.4 ' The courts have also strongly
emphasized conduct that does not fall within their willful and
wanton definitions.4 3 For example, simply alleging a failure to
supervise on the part of educators or administrators will not
satisfy the willful and wanton exception. 4 Moreover, teachers are
not expected to anticipate and guard against a student's sudden

committed willful and wanton misconduct when a counselor had been warned
of a classmate's threats to the victim but failed to respond to the warning,
which resulted in the student being injured when struck in eye by the same
classmate); Hadley v. Witt Unit Sch. Dist. 66, 462 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1984)
(holding that willful and wanton misconduct was at issue when teacher left
students unsupervised while they participated in a dangerous experiment that
involved hammering metal).
In Barth v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, an eleven-year-old male
student was injured while playing in the schoolyard. 490 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986), overruled by In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265 (Ill.
1997). He was taken to the school office where his illness was apparent. Id.
The school secretary, after some delay, contacted his mother, who asked that
the boy be taken to the hospital. Id. Doctors discovered a blood clot on the
boy's brain that had caused severe physical and mental damage, due to the
delay in treatment. Id. at 80. The court held that the actions of the school
were willful and wanton. Id. at 84.
41. See Holsapple v. Casey Community Unit Sch. Dist., 510 N.E.2d 499, 500
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 69
N.E.2d 293, 300 (1946)). The Appellate Court defined willful and wanton
misconduct as an "intentional injury or an act 'committed under circumstances
exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as a failure, after
knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it...'."
Id.; Knapp v. Hill, 657 NE.2d 1068, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (quoting Burke v.
12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992)). The court held that to
establish willful and wanton misconduct, the plaintiff must allege
consciousness on part of the teacher, "either with knowledge of the serious
danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose
this danger to any reasonable man." Id.
42. See Knapp, 657 N.E.2d at 1074 (asserting that a plaintiff must establish
that the teacher was "aware or should have known that the lack of supervision
posed a high probability of serious harm or an unreasonable risk of harm.").
43. Id. at 1073. The plaintiff had to allege more than "mere inadvertence,
incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions" to establish
willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the school district. Id. (quoting
Burke, 593 N.E.2d at 522).
44. Holsapple, 510 N.E.2d at 500. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs complaint, the court held that the plaintiff had not sufficiently
alleged willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 501. The court noted that even
though a gathering of students produced a certain risk of injury, it did not
create such a high likelihood of injury so as to make the failure to supervise
willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 500. Further, "a teacher cannot be
required to watch the students at all times while in school, on the grounds, or
engaged in school-related activity." Id. at 500-01 (quoting Mancha v. Field
Museum of Natural History, 283 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1972)).
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behavior."
Arguably the aforementioned interpretations and definitions
coincide with interpretations of willful and wanton conduct in
other contexts. Even if the definitions are similar, the application
is distinct. Nevertheless, judges have in most cases failed to find
willful and wanton misconduct on the part of teachers and
administrators.4 6 Thus, a potential plaintiff, injured as the result
of the negligence of teachers or school administrators, has a very
small chance of establishing any liability. In fact, a plaintiffs
complaint will most likely not survive the pleadings.
Some plaintiffs have alternatively attempted to establish a
special duty exception,47 which imposes liability upon a public
entity that is otherwise immune pursuant to the Tort Immunity
Act.48 However, courts are reluctant to find that this special duty
of care applies to relationships between students and teachers or

administrators.49
School violence statistics are helpful and potentially
influential when assessing whether educators had knowledge or
were aware of impending violence or harm to students. In 1995,
the Illinois State Board of Education published a report on school

45. Knapp, 657 N.E.2d at 1074. The court maintained that a teacher
cannot supervise each and every child at all times while in school or while
engaged in a school-related activity. Id. (quoting Albers v. Community Consol.
Sch., 508 N.E.2d 1252 (1987)). The general potential for danger with groups of
children is not sufficient standing alone to sustain a claim for willful and
wanton misconduct. Id.
46. See cases cited supra in notes 39-40.
47. Thames v. Bd. of Educ., 645 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The
Court outlined the four elements necessary to establish a special duty:
1. the entity was uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to
which the plaintiff was exposed;
2. the injury was caused by specific acts or omissions on the part of the
entity;
3 the specific acts or omissions were affirmative or willful in nature;
and
4. injury occurred while the plaintiff was under the direct and
immediate control of the entity's employees or agents.
Id. at 448-49.
48. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 662 N.E.2d 1377, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
49. See Thames, 645 N.E.2d at 452 (rejecting finding that board's alleged
knowledge that weapons were routinely brought into schools did establish an
awareness that the plaintiff was in danger, but rather only a general
knowledge of possible danger to all students). See also Lawson, 662 N.E.2d at
1377. In Lawson, the court held that a school board that allegedly permitted
armed persons on the premises did not owe decedent a special duty of care;
rather, the board's duty to protect the decedent was the same as its duty to
protect all individuals who were lawfully on the premises. Id. at 1390. The
court reasoned that there was no evidence that the board knew a particular
student was in possession of a gun on the premises, or that the decedent was
in danger of being shot by that student. Id. at 1389.
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violence that exposed some alarming statistics. ° The report stated
that school violence was increasing, and more students were
getting into trouble due to violent or potentially violent behavior.51
For instance the report indicated the students surveyed in 1988
and 1989 only 1,573 were suspended for assault or battery, as
opposed to 5,840 in 1993 and 1994.52
The report also noted that the most compelling statistics were
from the Illinois Department of Health, which indicated that in
1993 homicide was the leading cause of death for young people
between the ages of 15 and 19. 53 The trend in teen violence is
further evidenced by the fact that teen murders have doubled in
the last ten years. This trend is even more alarming given that
within the next ten years the number of youths between the ages
of 15 and 19 is expected to increase by twenty-three percent, thus,
54
increasing the potential for youth violence and youthful victims.
Clearly, teachers and administrators have easy access to this
statistical information. Thus, they are on constructive notice that
violence in their schools is significantly increasing and their
students are becoming increasingly more violent. Arguably, this
knowledge should create a greater duty on the part of teachers and
educators, leading to a safer learning environment for students.

II. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY STANDARDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Illinois Legislature, as well as the Illinois courts, can look
to other jurisdictions for a template of a different, more effective
50. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SAFE AT SCHOOL... A PUBLIC
PROMISE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTORING SAFETY AND ORDER IN ILLINOIS
SCHOOLS 1 (1995).
51. Id. In a 1995 Illinois Youth Risk Behavior Survey of students in grades

9-12, twelve percent of male and two percent of female students had carried a
gun on one or more of the past thirty days. Id. at 19. Nine percent of students
had carried a weapon on school property at least once in the previous thirty
days. Id. Over twenty percent of all students, and thirty-three percent of
male students reported carrying some type of weapon at least once in the past
thirty days. Id. Further, this statistic was the same for the state as a whole

as when Chicago was excluded from the calculation.

Id. Six percent of

students had not attended school at least once in the past thirty days because
they felt unsafe. Id. Nine percent of students reported being threatened or
injured with a weapon on school property at least once in the past twelve

months. Id. In addition, data reported by 886 Illinois School Districts
indicated that students were arrested, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined 4,645 times for weapon use or possession, and 4,898 times for acts
of violence against teachers. Id. In addition, 9,810 disciplinary actions were
taken as a result of illegal gang activity, and there were 51,594 reported acts
of violence against students. Id. A similar survey was compiled in 1991 by
the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority that yielded similar

results. Id.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 21.
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standard of municipal liability in education. Part II of the
Comment focuses its analysis on the municipal liability standards
in other jurisdictions, specifically South Carolina, New Jersey,
New York, and California. Each of the aforementioned states has
a different standard of educational liability that is more lenient
than the current willful and wanton standard in Illinois.
A. South Carolina
South Carolina has a "gross negligence" standard of
municipal liability, which has been codified by statute.55 When
governmental entities exercise their duty to supervise, protect, or
control in a grossly negligent manner, they can be held
accountable for student injuries.56 The South Carolina courts have
defined gross negligence as the failure to exercise "slight care." 7
This gross negligence standard provides a limited waiver of a
A review of South
school board's governmental immunity."
Carolina case law shows that the gross negligence standard is
more advantageous to injured plaintiffs than the Illinois willful
and wanton 59 standard." Further, it does not subject school board
defendants to unreasonable liability."
Section 15-78-60(25) of the South
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(25).
Carolina Tort Claims Act states that:
[t]he governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from
responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision,
protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patent,
prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the
responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.
Id.
56. Clyburn v. Sumter County Sch. Dist. 17, 429 S.E. 2d 862, 865 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1993).
57. Doe v. Orangeburg County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 495 S.E.2d 230, 224 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1998). The South Carolina courts have also defined gross negligence
as the "absence of slight care that is necessary under the circumstances," and
"where a person is so indifferent as to his conduct as not to give slight care to
what he is doing." Clyburn, 429 S.E.2d at 865.
58. Cary Silverman, School Violence: Is it Time to Hold School Districts
Responsible for Inadequate Safety Measures?, 145 W. ED. L. REP. 535, 551

(2000).
59. The Illinois Appellate Court defined willful and wanton misconduct as
an "intentional injury or an act committed under circumstances exhibiting a
reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as failure, after knowledge of
impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it." Holsapple, 510
N.E.2d at 500.
60. See Doe, 495 S.E.2d 230 (asserting that the school board demonstrated
gross negligence when a male student, who had previously fondled female
students, sexually assaulted the victim when the teacher left them alone);
Duncan v. Hampton County Sch. Dist. #2, 517 S.E.2d 449 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(affirming the trial court's finding against the school board defendant that
demonstrated gross negligence when it left unsupervised two mentally
handicapped male students who sexually abused the victim).
61. See Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 534 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. Ct. App.
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A principal advantage of the gross negligence standard is the
likelihood of a jury trial." Conversely, Illinois courts dismiss
countless complaints for failure to state a cause of action.6 The
Illinois courts should not be so willing to dismiss claims made
against school districts.64 Early dismissal deprives an injured
student plaintiff of an opportunity to have a jury trial, and denies
plaintiffs a remedy for their injuries.65 The gross negligence
standard, on the other hand, affords a jury, as opposed to a judge,
with an opportunity to determine whether the alleged negligent
conduct renders the school board liable. Policy favors the gross
negligence standard because the question of school board liability
is more appropriately a question of fact for a jury rather than a
question of law for a judge.
B. New Jersey
New Jersey's school districts are subject to liability pursuant
to ordinary principles of negligence.66 Particularly, New Jersey
has experienced a shift towards the recognition that municipal
entities should be held accountable for injuries pursuant to
principles of common law negligence.67 The New Jersey Supreme
Court emphasized that the teacher-student relationship is not
voluntary, but rather one that is compelled by law.66 Therefore,
school authorities are obligated to take the precautions necessary

2000) (holding that the school district was not liable for the wrongful death of
the decedent, because the school district had no direct knowledge or notice of
the animosity between the students).

62. See Grooms v. Marlboro County Sch. Dist., 414 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that whether the school district demonstrated gross
negligence when mentally handicapped student was assaulted while the
janitor watched was a question of fact for the jury); Woodell v. Marion Sch.
Dist. One, 414 S.E.2d 794 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that whether the
plaintiff student's injury resulted from the alleged grossly negligent
supervision was a question of fact for the jury).
63. See Henrich v. Libertyville High Sch., 683 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of action); D.M.
v. Nat'l School Bus Serv., Inc., 713 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of action because
Section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act afforded the school district immunity);

A.R. v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 724 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of action, because the school board
defendant was immune pursuant to Section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act);
Poynter v. Kankakee School Dist. No. 111, 370 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege willful and wanton conduct).
64. Landra Ewing, When Going to School Becomes an Act of Courage:
Students Need Protection From Violence, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 627, 641

(1998).
65. Id.
66. Jackson v. Hankinson, 238 A.2d 685, 688 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1968).

67. Id.
68. Id.
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to ensure safe learning environments for students and teachers.69
Likewise, by forcing students to attend school, students should be
able to safely rely on security measures implemented by the
schools. 0
New Jersey also acknowledges the in loco parentis nature of
the teacher-student relationship.71 The Illinois courts recognize
this relationship as well; however, the Illinois interpretation limits
rather than expands liability.72 Further, Illinois and New Jersey
courts both recognize the impulsivity of children, yet both courts
perceive its implications differently. New Jersey concedes that
teacher supervision can prevent impulsive behavior in children.73
Illinois, on the other hand, asserts that teachers should not be
expected to guard against impulsive student behavior.74
69. Id. The duty to supervise goes beyond the duty to supervise against the
criminal acts of third parties. See Sutphen v. Benthian, 397 A.2d 709 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (reversing trial court's finding that the defendant
school district had no duty to supervise a floor hockey game in which plaintiff
was injured); Law v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 417 A.2d 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1980) (holding that defendant school board had a duty to supervise
students who were run over by a city fire truck while they were participating
in a recreational program administered by the board).
70. Ewing, supra note 64, at 643.
71. Titus v. Lindberg, 228 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1967). By nature of
the teacher-student relationship, teachers are entrusted with a duty to
supervise students. Id. The failure to exercise this duty with reasonable care
will result in liability on behalf of both the teacher and the school board. Id.
In recognizing the significance of the teacher-student relationship the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that:
[t]he duty of school personnel to exercise reasonable supervisory care for
the safety of students entrusted to them, and their accountability for
injuries resulting from failure to discharge that duty, are well
recognized in our State and elsewhere.
Id. at 68.
72. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84(a); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24. Section
5/34-84(a) and Section 5/24-24 of the Illinois School Code state that "teachers
stand in the relation of parents and guardians to pupils." Id. See Kobylanski
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ill. 1976) (recognizing that the
teacher-student relationship is cloaked with willful and wanton immunity;
therefore, teachers are immune from liability resulting from negligent
supervision, unless willful and wanton conduct is plead or proven).
73. Titus, 228 A.2d at 70 (quoting Ohman v. Bd. Of Educ., 90 N.E.2d 474,
478 (1949)). The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that:
[c]hildren have a known proclivity to act impulsively without thought of
the possibilities of danger. It is this lack of mature judgment which
makes supervision so vital. The mere presence of the hand of authority
and discipline normally is effective to curb this youthful exuberance and
to protect the children against their own folly.
Id.
74. Knapp, 657 N.E.2d at 1074 (quoting Albers, 508 N.E. 2d at 1252). The
Illinois Appellate Court noted that:
a teacher cannot supervise each and every child at all times while in
school or while engaged in a school-related activity.
The general
potential for danger with groups of children is not sufficient standing
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The common law negligence theory of liability has been
criticized for subjecting school districts to too much liability, while
at the same time requiring additional financial expenditures in an
effort to avoid liability.75 However, New Jersey school districts
have not become prey to injured student plaintiffs.7 6 Further,
plaintiffs must obviously establish all the elements of common law
negligence, especially proximate cause, which is not an easy
burden. Additionally, a negligence standard of liability affords
student plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain a remedy, whereas the
stricter Illinois standard does a disservice to many plaintiffs by
favoring the defendant and not allowing for a just remedy.
C. New York
While New York, like New Jersey, has a negligence standard
of municipal liability in education, the New York courts strongly
emphasize the element of "foreseeability."77 Teachers have a duty
to adequately supervise students, and are required to exercise the
same care a parent would observe in comparable circumstances."8
If a third party caused a student's injury, as a condition to a school
board's liability, a student must establish that the third-party acts
which caused the injury could have been reasonably anticipated. 9
Specifically, "[t]he test to be applied is whether under all the
circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act
or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the
situation created by the school's negligence."8 ° The same standard
applies when a student's injury does not involve the negligent or
criminal acts of a third party.8
However, without advanced
knowledge or forewarning, schools will not be held to insure
against the consequences of sudden, impulsive, unanticipated acts
of other students.82
alone to sustain a claim for wilful and wanton misconduct.

Id.
75. Silverman, supra note 58, at 551.
76. See Doktor v. Greenberg, 155 A.2d 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)
(holding that the school district was not liable for a student, because the need
for closer supervision over students could not have reasonably been
apprehended).
77. See Busby v. Ticonderoga Cent. Sch. Dist., 258 A.2d 762 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (asserting that the premise of a school board's liability is based upon the
foreseeability of harm pertaining to actual or constructive notice of a student's
dangerous propensity of previous conduct).
78. Mirand v. New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989)

(holding that defendant school board had a duty to exercise ordinary
reasonable care to protect students who were involved in extracurricular
activities).
82. Busby, 684 N.E.2d at 710.
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Even though a liability standard centered on foreseeability is
more stringent than the gross negligence and negligence
standards discussed above, it is still more prone to plaintiff
recovery than the Illinois standard,83 and is more likely to afford a
plaintiff a jury trial.84 New York's standard also protects the
school districts from senseless lawsuits, which are financially
draining.85 Moreover, the plaintiff must establish all elements of
negligence.86
Thus, injured student plaintiffs have a reasonable chance of
recovery, notwithstanding the potential difficulty in proving a
negligence cause of action.
D. California
California's legislature codified municipal liability, including
school district liability, by statutes that, among other things,
impose liability for breach of a mandatory duty created by
statute.87 Section 815.16 of the California Code holds school
83. See Mirand v. New York, 637 N.E.2d 263 (affirming trial court's finding
that the incident which led to the plaintiff student's injuries was a foreseeable
consequence of a situation created by the school's negligence). But see D.M v.
Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc. 713 N.E.2d 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the
school district, which had knowledge of the assailant's previous attack on the
victim, was not liable for the plaintiffs assault by his attacker); Templar v.
Decatur Pub. Sch. Dist., 538 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that the
school district, which had been informed by the victim's parent that a certain
male student had threatened the victim several times was not liable for
injuries sustained by the victim at the hand of the same male student, on
school grounds); Poynter v. Kankakee Sch. Dist., 370 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) (holding that the school board, which had information of a possible race
riot, was not liable for injuries that resulted from the riot).
84. See Gonzalez v. Mackler, 19 A.D.2d 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (holding
that whether the school district was liable for the injury sustained by a
student who was struck by a rubber-tipped pointer thrown by a second student
was a question of fact for the jury); Cianci v. Bd. of Educ., 18 A.D.2d 930 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1963) (holding that whether the school district was vicariously liable
for negligence of a principal who had left the student plaintiff and his attacker
unsupervised, was a question of fact for the jury).
85. Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266. In Mirand, the Court of Appeals asserted
that:
[sichools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably
be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and
activities of students; therefore, schools are not to be held liable 'for
every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure
another'... an injury caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act of a
fellow student ordinarily will not give rise to a finding of negligence
absent proof of prior conduct that would have put a reasonable person
on notice to protect against the injury-causing act.
Id.
86. Id. The Court of Appeals recognized that even if a breach of supervision
is established, a plaintiff must still establish the elements of negligence,
particularly proximate case. Id.
87. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 815.6 (West 2000)
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districts liable for their negligence when subjected to a mandatory
duty imposed by statute," and Section 49079 of the Education
Code imposes a mandatory duty on school districts to inform
teachers of a student's record of physical violence." Further,
Section 44807 of the Education Code provides in part that "every
teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account
for their conduct." 90
California school districts as well as their employees have a
general duty to supervise student conduct on school grounds."'
The duty involves and is limited to school-related functions and
activities taking place during school hours. 92 A school district is
not an insurer of safety, but it is liable for the negligence of its
officers and employees. 3 Further, it is not necessary that the very
injury that occurred be foreseeable by school district authorities. 4
Rather, negligence is established if a "reasonably prudent person
would foresee that injury of the same general type would be likely
to happen in the absence of such safeguards."' Still, an injured
plaintiff must establish a proximate causal connection between the

88. Id. Section 815.6 of the California Education Code states that:
[wihere a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an
enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular
kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind
proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public
entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the
duty.
Id. Note that whether a statute was intended to impose a mandatory duty on
school boards is a question of law. Clausing v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1239 (1990).
89. Skinner v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 37 Cal. App. 4th 31, 39 (1995).
Section 49079 states in part that:
[a] school district shall inform the teacher of every student who has
caused, or who has attempted to cause, serious bodily injury or injury
... to another person. The district shall provide the information to the
teacher based on any written records that the district maintains or
receives from a law enforcement agency regarding a student described
in this section.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49079 (West 2001).
90. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West 2001).
91. See Iverson v. Muroc Unified Sch. Dist., 32 Cal. App. 4th 218 (1995)
(asserting that the school district had a duty to supervise students during
school sessions, school activities, recesses, and lunch periods).
92. Id. at 41. See Rodrigues v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 322 P.2d 70
(Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that the school district was liable for its negligent
supervision of a student who died from injuries sustained from a fall off a
playground apparatus).
93. See Charonnat v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. App. 2d 840,
843 (1943); Beck v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 2d 503, 507
(1964).
94. Beck, 225 Cal. App. 2d at 507.
95. Id.
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96
lack of supervision and the incident that caused the injury.
In 1982, the legislature amended the California Constitution
to contain a section that addressed in part the safety requirement
of California schools.97 Specifically, the section declares that, "[aill
students and staff of primary, elementary, junior high and senior
high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which
are safe, secure and peaceful.""s The amendment arguably imposed
an affirmative duty on school districts to make their schools safe
and free from crime and violence.99
California's theory of school district liability is distinctly
different from the Illinois willful and wanton standard. California,
through the enactment of Section 28(c) of the California
Constitution, has taken a proactive approach to addressing school
violence and the dangers sometimes associated with schools."9 9
Unfortunately, Illinois has yet to take such a proactive approach to
its schools. The California legislature has made it easier for
injured student plaintiffs to recover by using traditional
negligence standards to assess the liability of school districts.'O

96. Id.
97. Kimberly A. Sawyer, The Right to Safe Schools: A Newly Recognized
Inalienable Right, 14 PAC. L.J. 1309, 1310 (1983). In 1982 California voters
approved Proposition 8, known as "The Victim's Bill of Rights," as a response
to an escalating crime rate. Id. Voters hoped to help rid school campuses of
crime and violence by providing school districts with an affirmative duty to
make their schools safe. Id.
98. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
99. See Sawyer, supra note 97, at 1309. However, the California Court of
Appeals held that Section 28(c) of the California Constitution:
[iusnot self-executing, in the sense that it does not provide an
independent right of action for damages. Neither does it impose an
express affirmative duty on any government agency to guarantee the
[rather, it merely indicates principals, without
safety of schools ...
laying down rules by means of which those principals may be given the
force of law.
Clausing, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1237.
100. Forgnone v. Salvador Union Elementary Sch. Dist., 106 P.2d 932
(1940); Charonnat v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 56 Cal. App. 2d 840
(1943). Also note that as early as the 1940's, California's school districts were
subjected to their current negligence standard of liability. Id. At the same
time, Illinois school districts were protected from any liability pursuant to
sovereign immunity. See generally Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959) (abolishing the notion of sovereign immunity
with respect to school boards and school districts).
101. See Forgnone v. Salvador Union Elementary Sch., 106 P.2d 932 (1940)
(reversing demurrer that trial court granted to defendant school district in
matter in which student plaintiffs arm was broken by another student);
Charonnat v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 56 Cal. App. 2d 840 (affirming
trial court's verdict for student plaintiff whose leg was broken by another
student during recess); Buzzard v. East Lake Sch. Dist., 93 P.2d 233 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (affirming trial court's verdict for student plaintiff who
was injured when another student ran over him with a bike).
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Illinois, on the other hand, continues to bar recovery by placing
almost impossible standards on student plaintiffs that emphasize
traditional notions of sovereign immunity.1 2
III. IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSING LOWER LIABILITY STANDARDS ON
SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The aforementioned state liability standards demonstrate
that imposing liability on school districts for their acts of
negligence will not bankrupt school districts or subject them to
senseless tort claims.0 3 It is possible to hold school districts to a
higher standard, thereby creating a safer learning environment for
students and teachers. While Illinois continues to adhere to oldfashioned theories of sovereign immunity, other state jurisdictions
have acknowledged that school districts, as municipal entities, are
not protected by a blanket of immunity. Illinois should look
outside its borders for examples of municipal liability in education
that afford injured student plaintiffs a remedy.
Imposing liability on school districts would encourage them to
limit their liability by implementing security measures intended to
limit student injury.' When a school district ignores the safety of
its students and fails to implement reasonable security measures,
it should be subjected to liability for the injuries that naturally
result from its lack of security implementation. 5 Thus, the
primary purpose of imposing a lower standard would be the
heightened security that would afford students a greater sense of
security and provide a more conducive environment for learning.
Thereby, it provides schools with greater incentive to increase
security, in order to offset the cost of potential litigation.0 6
Naturally, a lower standard might result in large damage awards
against school districts; 7 however, "it is likely that taxpayers are
102. See Henrich v. Libertyville High Sch., 683 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (affirming trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs claim for failure to state a
cause of action, because school board was immune from liability pursuant to
the Tort Immunity Act); D.M. v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., 713 N.E.2d 196 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) (holding Tort Immunity Act afforded school district immunity); A.R.
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 724 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs claim failed to state a cause of action because the school board
defendant was immune from liability pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act).
103. See Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 534 S.E.2d 275 (holding that
a South Carolina school district was not liable because of a lack of direct
knowledge); Doktor v. Greenberg, 155 A.2d 793 (holding that a New Jersey
school district was not liable because the injury could not have been
reasonably foreseeable); Mirand v. New York, 637 N.E.2d 263 (affirming that
New York school districts are not liable "for every thoughtless or careless act
by which one pupil may injure another.")

104.
105.
106.
107.

Silverman, supra note 58, at 550-51.
Ewing, supra note 64, at 643.
Id.
It is important to note that liability insurance directly protects school
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willing to bear the difference so long as they are assured that their
contribution will improve safety in their local schools." '° Other
scholars have suggested that even if schools feel compelled to
spend significant funds to improve safety, schools can expect longterm savings as a result of a decrease in workers' compensation
claims. 109
Illinois should look beyond the confines of its borders for
examples of other means to allocate liability upon its school
districts. New Jersey, South Carolina, California, and New York
have each implemented unique standards that afford injured
student plaintiffs a remedy, as well as protect school board
defendants from senseless liability."'
Although all four
approaches provide a logical framework for Illinois to follow, a
combination of the South Carolina and New York approach would
be most advantageous, given the current state of Illinois law.'
IV. A

PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN ILLINOIS

Illinois should adopt a gross negligence'. 2 standard with an
emphasis on foreseeability."' This proposed change would not be a
drastic change in the current law, but it would more readily afford
injured student plaintiffs an opportunity for recovery." 4 Illinois
plaintiffs would no longer be required to establish that school
board defendants had acted willfully and wantonly. Further, the
potential for school board defendants to present a theory of
district funds from large damage awards. Decker, supra note 13, at 144. In
1995, according to the Illinois Department of Revenue, Illinois school districts
only spent approximately three percent of their total budgets on liability
insurance, and "given the tremendous breadth of local government activity
and the relatively minor cost of insurance, it is illogical to impose liability on
individuals and private corporations but not local governments." Id. The
emphasis should not rest in immunizing school districts, but rather in
determining to what extent school districts will be held accountable for
negligence, especially when students have been injured. Id.
108. Id.
109. Noel M. Johnson, The Chicago Public Schools and Its Violent Students:
How Can the Law Protect Teachers?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 947 (1999).
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. See Kobylanski, 347 N.E.2d at 709 (holding that teachers and
administrators were only liable for their willful and wanton misconduct).
112. Doe, 495 S.E.2d 230. The South Carolina courts have defined gross
negligence as the failure to exercise "slight care." Id.
113. The New York test, which emphasizes foreseeability, is "whether under
all the circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or
omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by
the school's negligence." Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266.
114. See generally Grooms, 414 S.E.2d 802; Woodell, 414 S.E.2d 794
(confirming that a gross negligence standard creates a high probability that
injured student plaintiffs would be granted a jury trial); Gonzalez, 19 A.D.2d
229; Cianci, 18 A.D.2d 930 (confirming that question of foreseeability creates a
question of fact for the jury).
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would be

Gross Negligence with an Emphasis on Foreseeability

An emphasis on foreseeability would require an injured
plaintiff to establish that the "negligent act or omission was a
normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the
school's negligence."" 6 Since plaintiffs would be required to
establish foreseeability along with the elements of gross
negligence, the foreseeability requirement would aid in deterring
senseless liability upon Illinois' school districts." 7 However, the
addition of the foreseeability requirement does not suggest that a
gross negligence standard would produce frivolous lawsuits
against Illinois school districts.
Rather, foreseeability would
provide another wall of protection for Illinois schools districts, and
Illinois law makers might find the proposal more attractive with
this additional safeguard.
The proposed combination of gross negligence and
foreseeability would provide the most effective and practical
alternative, given the current standard. The change would prove
significant for injured student plaintiffs. It would also provide a
realistic option for both the legislature and judicial system, which
118
continue to preserve archaic notions of sovereign immunity.
However, before Illinois can begin addressing the need for change,
both the legislature and the courts must recognize, as New Jersey
did, that sovereign immunity in this context is outdated and
impractical."' Unfortunately, as long as the Illinois courts and
legislature continue to associate sovereign immunity with
education, change is unlikely.
Countless injured student plaintiffs have been denied the
opportunity to proceed in the Illinois courts, because of either the
high willful and wanton standard, or the potential grant of school
115. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 et seq. See also Templar, 538 N.E.2d at
197 (corroborating the notion that the Tort Immunity Act, if applicable, takes

precedence over the Illinois School Code).
116. Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266.

117. Id. The New York Court of Appeals asserted that school districts were
not liable for the unanticipated acts of students. Id.
118. Section 3-108 of the Tort Immunity Act was amended in 1998 to narrow
the scope of immunity for negligent supervision to exclude immunity from

willful and wanton conduct. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108. Prior to the 1998
amendment, educators were essentially immune from liability predicated on

the duty to supervise. Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has substantially
limited the minimal relief granted to plaintiffs through the School Code, 105
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et seq., by asserting that the Tort Immunity Act takes
precedent. Henrich, 683 N.E.2d at 140.

119. New Jersey has experienced a shift towards the realization that
municipal entities should be held accountable for injuries pursuant to
principals of common law negligence. Jackson, 238 A.2d at 688.
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district immunity.'
If those same plaintiffs had been able to
proceed according to the proposed gross negligence and
foreseeability standard, an entirely different result would have
occurred. For example, the female student in A.R. v. Chicago Bd.
of Educ.,"' who was sodomized by a male student on the bus,
might have been able to establish a question of fact regarding the
gross negligence of the bus driver and school as well as the
foreseeability of her injury.
Illinois could also propose a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing students and teachers the inalienable right to attend
schools that are safe, secure, and peaceful."' The amendment
would not impose an affirmative duty upon school districts. 123
However, it would acknowledge the legislature's emphasis on
school safety. An amendment would also give the citizens of
Illinois a voice and vote in this important matter.
B. Preventative Measures and a Safer School Environment
The goal of imposing a lower standard of liability is not to
create a situation that will potentially subject school districts to
tremendous liability. Rather, "the primary purpose of placing
greater responsibility on the school district would be to encourage
preventative measures and thereby create a safer environment for
all. " 12 4 In fact, if the gross negligence and foreseeability standard

is put into practice, Illinois schools would reap the benefits of safer
schools, greater emphasis on teacher-student relationships, more
administration involvement, and better, more well rounded
" ' However, in order to provide
programs on violence and safety.12
120. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

121. 724 N.E.2d at 10. The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiffs claim, because the school board defendant had immunity pursuant

to the Tort Immunity Act. Id. at 11.
122. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. This section asserts that "[aill students
and staff of primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the
inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful." Id.
123. See Clausing, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1237 (asserting that Section 28(c) of
the California Constitution did not create an affirmative duty upon school
districts).

124. Silverman, supra note 58, at 550-51; Ewing, supra note 64, at 643.
Asserting that students are required to attend school, therefore, they cannot
escape the environment of the school they are required to attend. Thus,
"courts should be more open to arguments that students are in the custodial
care of the school because students must attend school and must rely on the
school to provide a safe environment." Id.
125. In the 1999 Annual Report on School Safety, published by the U.S.
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice, a section was
dedicated to model school programs that have helped to improve school safety.
U.S. Department of Education and Justice, 1999 Annual Report on School
Safety 1 (1999), available at www/ed.gov/pubs/edpubs.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2001). For example, the Linwood Elementary School in Robins AFB,
Georgia instituted the Linwood Pride Discipline Plan, which helps students
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schools with an incentive to change, they must feel compelled to
allocate the funds necessary to accomplish these goals. The
proposed gross negligence and foreseeability standard would
provide this incentive. Conversely, the current willful and wanton
standard coupled with the possibility of immunity, provides school
districts with little financial incentive to allocate funds to the
aforementioned programs.
C. Adversarial Weaknesses
Opponents might contend that school districts, as
governmental entities, should be protected from excessive liability.
However, this argument was discredited by the Illinois Supreme
Court's 1959 decision in Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit
27
Dist.,126 which expressly rejected sovereign immunity.
Specifically, the court stated that "[wie do not believe that in this
present day and age, when public education constitutes one of the
biggest businesses in the country, that school immunity can be
justified on the protection-of-public-funds theory."'28 In the forty
years since the Moliter decision, schools have reaped the benefit of
capitalistic growth, and like other businesses and corporations,
should be held accountable for their actions.
Other jurisdictions also provide support for the rejection of
sovereign immunity as applied to school districts. For instance,
New Jersey has experienced a shift towards the realization that
school districts, as municipal entities, should be held accountable
for injuries pursuant to common law negligence." 9
Some opponents may also fear that an increase in liability
will substantially deplete valuable school funds. However, that
fear is illegitimate. The 1995 Illinois Property Tax Report.
revealed that Illinois school districts spent only 3.04% of their

take responsibility for their own actions. Id: at 41. The program has helped to

create a nurturing and safe learning environment. Id. At Otto Middle School
in Lansing, Michigan, The Peace Center offers students alternatives to

violence. Id. at 42. Through the coalition of parents, teachers, administration,
and students, The Peace Center has helped to establish a culture of non-

violence. Id. If Illinois school districts felt compelled to allocate the necessary
funds and manpower to violence prevention, many of the successful programs
listed in the 1999 Annual Report on School Safety, could become a reality for
Illinois students. See also Silverman, supra note 58, at 550-51 (asserting that
imposing liability upon school districts would encourage them to implement
programs and safety measures that would be advantageous to students).

126. 163 N.E.2d 89.
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 94. See also Decker, supra note 13, at 144(asserting that the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit

Dist. has been "swallowed by statutory and judicial exceptions").
129. Jackson, 238 A.2d at 688.
130. Decker, supra note 13, at 144.
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total budget on liability insurance.TM Thus, "given the tremendous
breadth of local government activity and the relatively minor cost
of insurance, it is illogical to impose liability on individuals and
private corporations but not local governments.' 32
D. A Realistic Change
A change in the liability standard will not eliminate the
reality of violence in Illinois schools. However, to effectuate a
positive change, some person or entity must take responsibility for
the violent tendencies of Illinois' youth. Following the aftermath
of the Columbine tragedy, President Clinton made the following
statement:
Let us speak clearly and with one voice .... Acts of hate must
strengthen our resolve and deepen our determination that
Americans will come together and stand together against violence,

intolerance, and hatred. In all these efforts we must first assume
responsibility, at home and at school,
in Hollywood and the
33
heartland, and here in Washington.

Must Illinois wait for a school tragedy to occur in one of its
schools before its lawmakers and courts address the need for more
administration intervention in Illinois schools?
CONCLUSION

This Comment does not offer an absolute answer to ending
the violence and injury prevalent in Illinois schools;' 34 however, it
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. U.S. Department of Education and Justice, 1999 Annual Report on
School Safety 17 (1999), available at www.ed.gov/pubs/edpubs.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2001) (emphasis added). The report included several reactions
to the Columbine tragedy, which addressed the need for school intervention.
For example, Linda Marinovich of Seattle, Washington stated that "until the
schools start looking at our kids as individuals and start addressing them
according to their needs, we are going to continue to have this problem," and
Holli Eddins of New Orleans, Louisiana stated that "[t]eachers and school
counselors need to work together to evaluate their students." Id. at 22, 25.
Parents seem to agree that school administrations have an affirmative duty to
take some action towards providing students with a safe learning
environment.
134. The U.S. Department of Education and Justice publishes an annual
indicator of school crime and safety, which addresses the prevalence of crime
and violence in America's schools. U.S. Department of Education, Indicators
of School Crime and Safety 1 (1999), available at http://nces.ed.gov (last
visited Jan. 26, 2001). The report details specific behavior and tracks it over a
course of several years. Id. Even though crime rates in America's schools
have declined, this report suggests that violence, gangs, and drugs continue to
permeate our school systems. Id. For example, the students surveyed
appeared to feel less safe at school than students surveyed in previous years,
even though the actual percentages of victimization have decreased. Id.
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does offer an alternative. Clearly, governments must be proactive
when approaching problems relating to the public schools, and
until schools, as a municipal entity, begin to accept responsibility,
the violence will continue. Illinois' students deserve to attend
schools that foster learning and not violence.

